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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK T. PANOS, an
individual
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20040716-CA

vs.

Priority: 15

OLSEN AM) ASSOCIATES
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). On August 24, 2004 the Supreme
Court transferred the case to this Court which now has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). (R. 695).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court ruled correctly in granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff. Motions for summary judgment should be granted when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, we view all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and review the trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness." Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, ^10, 101
P.3d 371, 374 (citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch Dist, 2002 UT 130,^j 13, 63 P.3d 705).
In granting Summary Judgment, the trial court found that the merger doctrine
applies, is controlling in this case and thus operates as a bar to Plaintiffs claims. (R. 5591

560)(Addendum "A"). "The doctrine of merger ... is applicable when the acts to be
performed by the seller in a contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer.
Execution and delivery of a deed by the seller then usually constitute full performance on
his [or her] part, and acceptance of the deed by the buyer manifests his [or her]
acceptance of that performance even though the estate conveyed may differ from that
promised in the antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such a case, the deed is the final
agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and
unenforceable." Maynardv. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 449-50 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). Whether the doctrine of merger
applies is a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness affording no particular
deference to the trial court. Id.. Appellant must show legal error by the trial court in its
use of fixed principles and rules of law and clearly demonstrate that the trial court
incorrectly selected, interpreted, or applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, Subsections (c) and (e):
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
2

interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial Summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Panos appeals from the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of

Olsen and against him. Panos asserts the merger doctrine does not apply to the Warranty
Deed and that the trial court should have reformed the deed executed by him, on ihe basis
that his title company allegedly failed to draft the height restriction in the deed, exactly as
he intended.
EL

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On August 13, 2002, Panos filed a complaint in Third District Court against Olsen

and Associates Construction, Inc. alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory
judgment and injunction (R. 1-8). Specifically, Panos claims that the roof of the home
built on the property he sold to Olsen was higher than that permitted by the height
restriction of the warranty deed conveyed by Panos signed and conveyed(R. 2-3). Olsen
filed an Answer and Counterclaim on September 19, 2002 (R. 12-22). In his
Counterclaim, Olsen sought declaratory relief, made a claim of breach of contract,
negligence, bad faith, and fraud and misrepresentation against Panos (R. 15-20). An
Answer to said Counterclaim was filed by Panos on September 23, 2002 (R. 23-28). A
Stipulated Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order was filed by the parties on January 6,
2003, and signed by the Court the same date (R. 30-32).
Panos filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant's Counterclaims on
July 31, 2003 and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R. 278-279 and 280-336). On
3

August 15, 2003, Olsen filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 339-357). Panos filed a Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 22, 2003 (R. 358-372). In a minute entry dated September 5, 2003,
the Trial Court Judge granted Panos5 Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Olsen's
counterclaims involving the causes of actions for fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith
and dismissed said counterclaims, but denied the motion as it related to the bullet points
in Addendum No. 1, bullet point number five, seven and ten (R. 375- 378). This order is
not appealed herein.
On September 11, 2003, Olsen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against
Panos' claims and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R. 379-402). Specifically, he
asserted that the doctrine of merger applies to bar the claims of Panos. (R. 382-385) On
September 25, 2003, Panos filed his Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment claiming two exceptions to the merger doctrine applied, specifically ambiguity
in the final document and mutual mistake in the drafting. (R. 403-449). Panos also filed
a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 403-449). On October 15, 2003, Olsen filed
his Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion Summary Judgment and an
Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 452-497). On October
25, 2003, Panos filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiff s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment asserting for the first time that the warranty deed should be reformed (R. 512534).
On December 12, 2003, the Trial Court heard oral arguments concerning Plaintiff
and Defendant's Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 698, 559-560).
In an Order dated January 20, 2004, the trial court granted Olsen's Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissed Panos' claims and denied Panos' Cross Motion for Summary
4

Judgment (R. 698,559-560).
On April 1, 2004, Olsen filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Amend Order Concerning
Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in Support thereof (including additional
arguments and testimony not previously presented to the Court). (R. 561 -631). Panos
asserted that the trial court's alleged misunderstanding of Panos' survey and its
significance constitutes mistake under Rule 60(b) and, therefore, the court should amend
its prior order granting summary judgment for Olsen (R. 561-631). On May 7, 2004,
Olsen filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) (R. 633-647). On
May 13, 2004, Panos filed a Reply in Support of his Rule 60(b) Motion (R. 653-665). In
a minute entry dated June 7, 2004, the trial court ruled on Panos' 60(b) Motion to Amend
Order concerning Summary Judgment and denied the Motion. (R. 668-670). The trial
court expressly stated that it fully understood and considered Panos' survey argument but
expressly found that both the deed and the earlier purchase contract do not mention the
survey, which Panos now claims as the critical hinge point of his entire case. (R. 668670). Further, the Court also ruled that the "mistake" referred to in Rule 60(b) as grounds
for relief from a judgment does not refer to a Court's alleged mistake of law or fact as
urged by the Plaintiff nor are there other grounds for relief available as set out in Rule
60(b) and therefore denied the Motion (R. 668-670). The Court's ruling was signed as an
Order on June 29, 2004 (R. 679-680).
On August 9, 2004, pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and Motion, the trial court
ordered that Defendant's remaining counterclaims be dismissed with prejudice (R. 689690).
On August 19, 2004, Panos filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 691-692).

5

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are absolutely undisputed as evidenced in the record:
1.

On July 6, 2001, Olsen and Associates, by and through Jay Olsen, its owner,

presented to Plaintiff, Patrick Panos, a real estate purchase contract [hereafter, the
contract] for the purchase of certain vacant property identified as lot 29, East Ridge £2
Subdivision, and located at 111805 South Elm Ridge Road, Sandy, Utah [hereafter, the
property]. (R. at 379 and 404; 388-395)(See Addendum UA")
2.

On that same day, July 6, 2001, Patrick and Angela Panos signed their

acceptance as sellers on the contract. (R. 388-395, 404).
3.

On that same day, July 6, 2001, Patrick and Angela Panos signed their

acceptance of Addendum No. 1 to the contract (R. at 380, 404 and 394).
4.

Addendum No. 1 states, at bullet point 7: "the only height restriction (from

the road) is 32 ft." (R. at 380, 394, 404) (See Addendum "A.").
5.

On August 6, 200 L Patrick Panos signed and approved the ^ arranty deed

granting title to the property to Olsen and Associates Construction, Inc. as grantee. (R.
380, 397, 405) (See Addendum "B").
6.

The warranty deed contains the following language: "subject to the

following building restrictions: the roof level or highest portion of any building or
pemianent structure placed or constructed upon said land shall not be higher than 32 ft.
measured from the existing street lying west and adjacent to said land." (R. 380, 405,
397).
7.

The warranty deed as signed and approved by Panos did not describe any

further restriction, limitation or encumbrance upon the property (R. 380, 405. 397).
Neither the purchase contract or the warranty deed mentions the survey or any of its
6

minute engineering detail as later identified and asserted by Panos in this litigation. (R.
397).
8.

The warranty deed was duly recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County

Recorder on August 7, 2001 (R. 380, 405, 397).
9.

Panos never met or spoke with Olsen and chose, instead, to rely solely on

Panos' real estate agent and Title Company to determine and implement his intentions
and instruction. (R. 447-48, 489-90). Olsen did not close his purchase with Panos at
Panos5 Title Company. (R. 490).
10.

After the closing, construction was begun on a house on the property. At

one point, after the trusses of the home were adjusted to lower the roof, Olsen and
Associates retained Ensign Engineering to provide a survey determining the elevation of
the home and whether it was in compliance with the height restriction as stated in the
warranty deed. (R. 380, 405; 492-497) (See Addendum "C").

The following additional facts were presented in the form of admissible evidence such
as affidavit, portions of depositions, answers to interrogatories, etc.:
Testimony of Jay Olsen
1. Jay Olsen is the President of Olsen and Associates Construction, Inc. and the
sole shareholder. He is also the licensed real estate agent that represented Olsen and
Associates Construction, Inc. in the purchase of the property in question. (R. 442).
2. Olsen drafted Addendum No. 1 to the real estate purchase agreement which was
signed by the parties on July 6, 2001. (R. 500-50l)(See Addendum "B").
3. Olsen included bullet point no. 7 in Addendum No. 1 to the real estate purchase
agreement which says there was a height restriction of 32' "from the road" so he could
7

comply with said restriction if he was within 32' as measured from any point of his
choosing on the road. (R. 501)(Addendum "A").
4. Olsen expected to receive and requested some kind of aerial survey from Ron
Thrapp (real estate agent for Panos) for the limited purpose of verifying the relationship
to an existing retaining wall to the property line. (R. 479, 482).
5. Olsen admitted receiving a fax-cover sheet and fax copies of the plat map for
the property from Ron Thrapp (real estate agent for Panos) around the time of July 6,
2001. (R. 422, 431-32, 437, 440).
6. Olsen denies ever having a conversation with Thrapp about how the deed
restriction was going to be measured nor did Thrapp suggest any such information other
than the plain language stated in the contract and, ultimately, the deed. (R. 444).
7. Olsen doesn't know if he received a copy of a survey map at the time of
closing, but to the best of his recollection there was no other documentation discussed,
reviewed, or presented at closing that had to do with the height restriction or the plat from
Thrapp. (R 480, 501)
8. Olsen hired an engineer to conduct measurements and tell him whether the
house he constructed was within the 32' height restriction as stated in the deed. (R. 486)
Affidavit of David Jenkins
1. David Jenkins is an employee and licensed engineer at Ensign Engineering, a
planning and surveying firm in Salt Lake County. (R. 495)
2. At the request of Olsen and Associates, Jenkins surveyed and measured the
elevations on the property in question to determine whether the newly constructed house
complied with the 32 foot height restriction stated in the Warranty Deed. (R. 493, 496)
(See Addendum "C").
8

3. Jenkins found the house to be in compliance. (R. 496). The top of the roof was
measured and found to be 31.96 feet above the gutter point on the street at the north/west
corner of the property. (R. 496)
Testimony of Patrick Panos
1. Patrick Panos is the Plaintiff in the present action and the seller/grantor of the
property in question. (R. 1-2).
2. Panos never met nor talked personally to Olsen until after the closing of the
property. (R. 447-48, 489-90).
3. Panos claims a survey map was present with him at the closing and he assumes
one was present with Olsen when he closed, although Panos wasn't present for Olsen5s
closing. (R. 490)(See Addendum "D").
4. The closing for Panos and Olsen did not occur together at Panos company.. (R.
490)
Affidavit of Ron Thrapp
1. Ron Thrapp acted as a real estate agent for Panos in the sale of the property in
question. (R. 535).
2. From July 6, 2001 to August 6, 2001, Thrapp claims to have had numerous
conversations with Olsen concerning the terms of the sale including a height restriction
described in a survey and in the Warranty Deed to the property. (R. 535-36; 540-41) (See
Addendum "D").
3. On July 6, 2001, Thrapp claims to have faxed a survey map (Addendum "D")
with a fax cover sheet (Addendum "E") to Olsen with the Real Estate Purchase Contract.
(R. 536; 539). Other than the purchase contact, said survey map is the only document that
that Thrapp claims was ever exchanged between the parties describing the measurement
9

of a height restriction applicable to the property. (R. 536).
4. Thrapp claims that he confirmed that Olsen understood that Thrapp had the
survey and that it defined the restriction before Olsen made his offer. (R. 536).
5. From the time the Real Estate Purchase Contract was executed through the date
of closing, Thrapp claims to have had numerous conversations with Olsen about, but not
limited to, the survey (Addendum a D") and height restriction. (R. 536). Thrapp claims
that Olsen expressed to him that he understood the survey, including its description of the
precise measurement of the height restriction. (R. 536).
6. Thrapp attended the closing with Panos and attested that the survey was
provided by them to the title company to confirm how the height restriction contained in
the Warranty Deed was intended to be measured. (R. 536).
7. Thrapp's claims it is his understanding, based on his claimed conversations
with both parties prior to closing, that Panos and Olsen had the same understanding of the
survey including the precise measurement of the height restriction. (R. 536-37).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the doctrine of merger applies to the
warranty deed in question and operates as a bar to Panos' claims. The trial court was
correctly concluded that the warranty deed is not ambiguous and, therefore, no exceptions
to the doctrine of merger apply.
The trial court did not err in failing to grant Panos' request to reform the warranty
deed because there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that the intent of the parties was something other than what is found in
the express language of the warranty deed.
10

The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment in favor of Olsen and
against Panos was appropriate because no genuine issue remained as to any material fact.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE MERGER DOCTRINE APPLIES
TO THE WARRANTY DEED WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
This Court should affirm the trial court's order finding that the doctrine of merger
applies and acts as a bar to Panos' claims. It is well settled that the merger doctrine
applies in Utah. Maynard v. Wharton, Jr., 912 P.2d at 449. The general rule for the
doctrine of merger is that "on delivery and acceptance of a deed the provisions of the
underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or superseded by the
deed." Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986)(citing Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567
P.2d at 169)(citations omitted). The major justification for adherence to the merger
doctrine is that it preserves the integrity of the final document of conveyance and
encourages the diligence of the parties. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d at 795 {See also
Maynard v. Wharton, Jr, 912 P.2d at 451). "That diligence involves a duty on the part of
both parties to make certain that their agreements have in fact been fully included in the
final document." Id.
Whether the doctrine of merger applies is a question of law that this Court reviews
for correctness affording no particular deference to the trial court. Maynard v. Wharton,
Jr., 912 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah App. 1996).

11

A.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded as a Matter of Law That Panos' Claims Are
Barred by the Merger Doctrine.
The trial court correctly concluded that because the doctrine of merger applies to

the warranty deed and facts of this case, it acts as a bar to Panos' claim. Panos' claim
rests on a single complaint - that Olsen's house violates the height restriction found in the
warranty deed. (R. l-5)(Br. of Applt. pp. 16-28). The undisputed facts of the case are as
follows:
1.
On July 6? 2001, Olsen and Associates, by and through Jay Olsen, its owner,
presented to Plaintiff, Patrick Panos, a real estate purchase contract [hereafter, the
contract] for the purchase of certain vacant property identified as lot 29, East
Ridge #2 Subdivision, and located at 111805 South Elm Ridge Road, Sandy, Utah
[hereafter, the property]. (R. at 379 and 404; 388-395)(See Addendum "A")
2.
On that same day, July 6, 2001, Patrick and Angela Panos signed their
acceptance as sellers on the contract. (R. 388-395, 404).
3.
On that same day, July 6, 2001, Patrick and Angela Panos signed their
acceptance of Addendum No. 1 to the contract (R. at 380, 404 and 394).
4.
Addendum No. 1 states, at bullet point 7: "the only height restriction (from
the road) is 32 ft." (R. at 380, 394, 404) (See Addendum "A.").
5.
On August 6, 2001, Patrick Panos signed and approved a warranty deed
granting title to the property to Olsen and Associates Construction, Inc. as grantee
(R. 380, 397, 405) (See Addendum "B").
6.
The warranty deed contains the following language: "subject to the
following building restrictions: the roof level or highest portion of any building or
permanent structure placed or constructed upon said land shall not be higher than
32 ft. Measured from the existing street lying west and adjacent to said land" (R.
380, 405, 397).
7.
The warranty deed did not describe any further restriction, limitation, or
encumbrance upon the property (R. 380, 405, 397).
8.
Said warranty deed was duly recorded in the office of the Salt Lake Countv
Recorder on August 7, 2001 (R. 380, 405, 397).
9.
Thereafter, construction was begun on a house on the property. At one
point, after the trusses of the home were adjusted to lower the roof, Olsen and
Associates retained Ensign Engineering to provide a survey determining the
12

elevation of the home and whether it was in compliance with the height restriction
of the warranty deed (R. 380, 405; 492-497) (See Addendum "C").
Panos did not argue below nor does he challenge on appeal that the general rule for
the doctrine of merger applies in this case. As set out above, the general rule for the
doctine of merger is that "on delivery and acceptance of a deed the provisions of the
underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or superseded by the
deed,"

Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986)(citing Stubbs v. HemmerU 567

P.2d at 169)(citations omitted). Therefore, in this case when the warranty deed was
signed and approved by Panos and then delivered to and accepted by Olsen, any other
claimed agreements regarding the conveyance were extinguished and superseded by the
terms of the warranty deed. Thus, Panos concedes that the general rule applies and he
argues solely that an exception to the doctrine of merger is somehow applicable to
support what is, at most, a De Minimus height restriction violation if every subjective
intention and belief of Panos is conceded. (Br. of Applt. pp. 19-24).

B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That the Warranty Deed Was Unambiguous
and That the Merger Doctrine Therefore Applies.
In applying the doctrine of merger, the trial court correctly found that there was no

exception which would prevent operation of the merger doctrine in this case. (R. 55960)(See Addendum "F"). "The merger doctrine has four discrete exceptions: (1) mutual
mistake in the drafting of the final documents; (2) ambiguity in the final documents; (3)
existence of rights collateral to the contract of sale; and (4) fraud in the transaction/'
Maynardv. Wharton, Jr., 912 P.2d at 450 (citing Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d at 793;
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371-72 (Utah App. 1993)).
Although Panos initially asserted and relied upon two exceptions to the merger
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doctrine, he challenges only one on appeal- namely that the trial court erred in
concluding that the ambiguity exception did not apply. (Br. of App It. pp. 1-3, 16-28).
Because no other error regarding a claimed exception to the doctrine of merger has been
asserted on appeal, any such additional arguments are therefore waived. State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)(MIt is well established that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed").
"[A] trial court's interpretation of the words of an unambiguous, integrated
contract is a question of law, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness. Whether
ambiguity exists in a contract is itself a question of law." Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d
129, 131 (Utah App.\9%9)(ctimg Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983). A contract is ambiguous only "if the words used to express the meaning and
intention of the parties are 'insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to
reach two or more plausible meanings.' " Id. (quoting Metropolitan Property & liab. Ins.
Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1988))(quoting Central Sec. Mut Ins.
Co. v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 681 P.2d 15, 17 (1984)). However, "a parties' assertion of
a different meaning does not in itself render a contract ambiguous." Sparrow v. Tayco
Const Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d at
132 (Utah App. 1989)). "It is not the function of a court to rewrite an unambiguous
contract." Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d at 132 (Utah App.1989) (citing Provo City Corp.
v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)).
Furthermore, "contract provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely because
appellant claims they should be interpreted other than according to their plain meaning"
and this Court "will not inject ambiguity into a contract where none exists in order to
save [a party] from what, in retrospect, seems an ill-advised agreement." Home Sav. and
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Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 368 (Utah App.,1991)(quoting Crowiher
v. Carter, 767 P.2d at 132) See also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. US. Life Title Ins. Co.,
776 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah App. 1989).
When examining a deed to determine its meaning, it must be remembered that
"[d]eeds are construed according to ordinary rules of contract construction." Homer v.
Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993). Furthermore, when construing deeds:
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a question of law
for the court, and the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention
of the parties, especially that of the grantor, from the language used. The
description of the property in a deed is prima facie an expression of the intention
of the grantor and the term "intention," as applied to the construction of a deed, is
to be distinguished from its usual connotation. When so applied, it is a term of art
and signifies a meaning of the writing.... [TJhe intention of the parties to a
conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words used are ambiguous.
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979)(final emphasis added); see also
Stickling Mayflower Recreational Fonds v. NewparkResources, Inc., 917 F.2d 1239,
1246 (C.A.10 (Utah) 1990)("One of the most basic rules of contract interpretation is ihat
the intent of the parties to a written agreement is to be ascertained from the content of the
instrument itself."); Winnegar v. Froer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)('lf the
contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must
be determined from the words of the agreement.") See also Morris v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200-1201 (Utah 1983). Whether an
ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol evidence may be
permitted; when the existence of a contract and the identity of its parties are not in issue
and when the contract provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of the contract can
appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment. Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial court correctly concluded that the language of the
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warranty deed is unambiguous. (See Addendum "F")(R. 668-670, 668-670). This
finding is supported by simply looking to the language of the warranty deed itself as
required by the case law above. The language of the warranty deed reads in pertinent
part:
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING BUILDING RESTRICTIONS:
THE ROOF LEVEL OR HIGHEST PORTION OF ANY BUILDING OR
PERMANENT STRUCTURE PLACED OR CONSTRUCTED UPON SAID
LAND SHALL NOT BE HIGHER THAN 32 FEET, MEASURED FROM THE
EXISTING STREET LYING WEST AND ADJACENT TO SAID LAND
(R. 449) (See Addendum "B").
Panos claims that the language "from the existing street" is ambiguous. (Br. of
Applt. pp. 19-24). He claims that the measurement for the height restriction should have
been taken from a specific spot on the street west and adjacent to the property and
referenced in Appellant's Brief Exhibits "E" and "F". (Br. of Applt. 22-24; Br. of Applt.
Exhibits "E" and "F"). Panos claims this exact measuring point on the street was
understood and agreed upon by the parties prior to his execution of the warranty deed
although he approved the language of the warranty deed by signing it. (Br. of Applt. pp.
22-24,; Br. of Applt. Exhibits "E" and "F"). The Warranty Deed contains no such
reference to the allegedly all important survey. The Court looked to the purchase contract
and again, no such reference is found there as well. (R. 559-60; 668-670)(Addendum
"F").
The warranty deed does not contain the narrow measurement requirement now
advocated by Panos. It specifies that the height restriction is to be "32 feet, measured
from the existing street lying west and adjacent to said land." (R. 449)(See Addendum
*A^). This restriction requires that the measuring point be taken anywhere from the
"existing street lying west and adjacent to said land." (R. 449)(Addendum UA"). It is,
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therefore, broader than what Panos now claims he originally desired to be the location for
the measurement.
Panos claims that it was not his intention to allow a broad a measuring point from
the street generally and asserts that Olsen must have understood that this was not his
intention. (Br. of Applnt. pp. 20-24). He further claims that the language of the warranty
deed can be reasonably understood as presenting multiple plausible interpretations for the
location of the measuring point and that the warranty deed is, therefore, ambiguous. (Br.
of Applnt. p. 21). Panos asserts that because the warranty deed, which he signed an
approved, allows the measuring point to be taken "from the existing street" (which could
be more than location), such multiple possibilities constitute "multiple plausible
interpretations" of the deed.
The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent. Simply because the deed provides
a broader area for the location of the measurement than the single exact location now
advocated by Panos, does not mean that the deed is open to multiple interpretations or
meanings. In fact, the opposite is true. Because the deed clearly provides a general
location for the measurement of the height restriction that is more generous than what
Panos now claims to have intended it is nonetheless unambiguous. As set out above,
"contract provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely because appellant claims they
should be interpreted other than according to their plain meaning" and this Court "will
not inject ambiguity into a contract where none exists in order to save [a party] from
what, in retrospect, seems an ill-advised agreement." Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas.
and Sun Co., 817 P.2d 341, 368 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d
ai 132) See also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 933, 937
(Utah App. 1989).
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It cannot be over emphasized that Panos signed and approved the deed as written.
(See Addendum "B"). The plain meaning of the warranty deed language is that the height
restriction of 32 feet should be "measured from the existing street5' and hence any point
from the street satisfies this requirement. The language is not ambiguous and the trial
court ruled accordingly. It is only "ambiguous" to someone who wants to later narrow
what he failed to restrict before funds were received and when the buyer was still free to
cancel the sale if conditions were not as he expected.
Because the language of the warranty deed is unambiguous, it is irrelevant what
Panos intended or what Olsen knew or didn't know of said intentions. Regardless, Olsen
refutes Panos' claims that the parties had reached some agreement regarding a more
narrowly defined height restriction and that Panos subjective intentions should bear on the
outcome of this case.
In Maynard this Court was faced with an argument similar to, but more compelling
than Panos' attempt to include documents outside the final deed as part of the conveyance
of real estate. Maynard v. Wharton, Jr., 912 P.2d at 448-49. In Maynard, both the seller
and the buyer acknowledged, prior to closing, that one lot out of multiple parcels of
property offered for sale was in fact not owned by the seller. Id. The lot was identified
by both parties and specifically excluded from the sale in the final warranty deed and
property description. Id. However, even though the parties discussed the issue, they had
not agreed to any adjustment of the purchase price by the scheduled closing date. Id. at
449,
At a simultaneous closing meeting, the buyer and seller in Maynard met, and the
buyer hand-delivered "closing instructions" to both the title company and the seller. Id.
Those instructions reserved to the buyer the right to dispute proper ownership of the one
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parcel after closing, and the right to claim damages against the seller. Id Although both
parties evidently admitted the instructions were presented at the closing, neither buyer or
seller signed the "closing instructions" and they were not incoporated or referenced in the
warranty deed. Id. The closing took place, and the warranty deed was executed and
exchanged. Id.
A month later, the buyer sued the seller for breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation and fraud. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller.
Id. On appeal, this Court upheld the trial cout's ruling and in doing so made the
following statements:
Parties to real estate transactions have a duty "to make certain that their
agreements have in fact been fully included in the final document. In the present
case, Buyers claim that delivering their "Closing Instructions" to sellers and the
title company fulfilled their duty of diligence. We disagree. Parties to real estate
transactions must ensure that any agreements involving conveyance or
encumbrance of title are incoporated into the final closing document, which is
usually a warranty deed. Buyers' "Closing Instrctions" were not incorporated into
the deed that sellers rendered and buyers accepted. Accordingly, the "Closing
Instructions'" have no legal significance.
Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
The parallels between the present case and Maynard are compelling. Instead of
"closing instrutions" as was the case in Maynard, Panos maintains that a document (a
survey) was provided to Olsen and discussed with him prior to closing. (Br. of Applt. p.
23)<R. 431-32, 536)(Addendum "D"). Panos maintains that this document established
that the height restriction must be measured from an exact measuring point obscurely
identified in a survey. (Br. of Applt. p. 22-23)(Addendum "D"). Also like the facts in
Maynard, no reference to that survey is contained in the warranty deed. (R. 449) (See
Addendum "B").
Unlike Maynard where the parties agreed that provisions were omitted from the
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deed, in the present case Panos is alone in his attempt to vary and add to the provisions of
the deed. The parties do not agree that the survey was factor at closing. (R. 490, 536).
Panos acknowledges, however, that the closing was a split one, that the closing for the
two parties took place at different times, that Panos was not present for Olsen's closing
and that he never met or spoke with Olsen. (R. 490). The real estate agent also
acknowledges he was present at the time of Panos' closing but does not state he was
present for Olsen's. (R. 536). Panos and his real estate agent, therefore, have no personal
knowledge of whether the survey was present with Olsen at the time of his closing. Olsen
testified he doesn't know if he received a copy of a survey map at the time of closing, but
to the best of his recollection there was no other documentation discussed, or reviewed, or
presented at closing that had to do with the height restriction or plat from the real estate
agent. (R. 480, 501).
The grant of summary judgment in the present case is even more strongly
supported by the merger doctrine than in Maynard because only Panos seeks to introduce
the survey as a collateral document and such does not even rise to the level of mutually
agreed upon closing instructions.1
Panos identifies several cases and attempts to use them as expressions of relevant
case law but said cases have been taken out of context. In Verhoef v. Ashton, 740 p.2d 1342
(Utah App. 1987) Panos cites the sentence "when agreements are executed substantially
contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be considered as a whole and
harmonized if possible" to attempt to support his position that the survey (see Addendum
"D") should be read together with the warranty deed to understand and/or narrow the
measuring point of the height restriction. (Br. of Applt. p. 26-27). Panos misreads the case.
First, Verhoefmvob/td a dispute over the interpretation of a land sale contract and an escrow
agreement, not a deed or the doctrine of merger as it applies to deeds, and its applicability
to the case at hand should be, therefore, seriously questioned.
Second, even if Verhoefdoes have some limited application to the case at hand, it does
not stand for the proposition asserted by Panos. The very sentence quoted refers to
"agreements [ ] executed subtantially contemporaneously" that are "clearly interrelated."
Id. Although the warranty deed can be considered an "executed agreement," the survey
referred to is not. It is a document prepared by a third party and not executed nor signed by
20

Furthermore, although Panos claims that there was some "meeting of the minds" or
agreement regarding a supposed exact measuring point for the height restriction, the facts
presented do not bear this out. (Br. of Applt. p. 22-23). First, this document, a survey,
purported to provide an agreed upon exact measuring point for the height restriction, does
not explicitly lay out any agreement between parties about any said measuring point, nor
is it necessarily clear to the untrained eye, without expert testimony, that it says what
Panos asserts.2 (R. 43 l-32)(See Addendum "D")- Panos provided no expert testimony to
the trial court regarding any explanation of said survey prior to the time of the ruling on
the motion for summary judgment and there was, therefore, no basis for the trial court to
either of the parties in this case. (See Addendum "D"). The only other document in this case
that fits the bill of an "executed agreement" is the Real Estate Purchase Contract which
supports Olsen's position because it contains substantially the same broader language
regarding the height restriction as does the warranty deed. (R. 388-395; 397)(See Addendum
"A" and "B") The trial court so noted that fact in its ruling. (R. 668-670)..
Panos also cites the case of Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) for
the proposition that a court will consider collateral agreements in construing deeds. (Br. of
Applt. p. 26). Winnegar, however, dealt with two different situations than the case at hand.
The first issue, involved a dispute over the interpretation of two different agreements which
made up an assignment agreement. Id. at 108-109. This first issue did not involve a deed
or the doctrine of merger as it applies to deeds, and its applicability to the case at hand should
be, therefore, seriously questioned.
The second issue dealt with the narrow question of whether the warranty deed
executed acted as a conveyance of fee title or was transferred as security for the right to
receive future payments. Id. at 110. In that narrow context parol evidence is admissible in
equity to show that a deed, although absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage. Id.
This, however, is not the situation in the case at hand. Panos has not alleged that the
warranty deed executed did not transfer fee title to Olsen. If he cites this case in the hopes
of persuading this Court to extend the application of Winnegar to the facts of the case at
hand, he has not explicitly argued it. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed," Slate v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah
1998).
2

Counsel for Panos spent a great deal of time during oral argument attempting to
explain his survey his assertion that it clearly sets out the agreement of the parties regarding
a precise measuring point for the height restriction. (R. 698 at 16-17, 20-25). Even the
judge, who used to be a surveyor apparently, had trouble understanding how the survey alone
communicated or evidenced an agreement of the partes regarding an exact measuring point
for the height restriction. (R. 698 at 25).
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conclude that the survey did anything to establish in part any sort of agreement between
the parties.3
Second, because Panos never spoke with personally or met Olsen prior to the
closing where the warranty deed was executed, this supposed agreement or "meeting of
the minds" supposedly occurred simply through the conversations between Olsen and
Panos' real estate agent. (R. 535-538). These conversations were never reduced to any
writing but are merely supposed recollections of verbal conversations. (R, 535-538).
However, in a previous motion filed by Panos for summary judgment against Olsen as to
his counterclaims, Panos stated in his statement of the facts section that u[o]ther than the
warranty deed, there were no agreements at the time of closing which created any
obligations between the parties which survived the closing." (R. 283). Panos then went
on to argue in the motion that the merger doctrine applied and that any verbal discussions
between real estate agents are inadequate to create legally binding obligations. (R. 284).
This argument and statement of fact belies Panos' arguments in this appeal.
Finally, and most telling, the only writing signed by both parties, is the Real Estate

Panos may maintain that this statement is not correct in that he supplied to the court
an affidavit by Randy D. Smith, a licensed surveyor, stating that Smith completed the survey
in question and also surveyed the house built on the property after the time of closing to
determine its compliance or non-compliance with the height restriction in the warranty deed.
(R. 627-629). This affidavit, along with several other arguments and exhibits, were not
provided to the trial court until April 1, 2004, between some 70-84 days after the order
granting summary judgment in favor of Olsen had been signed. (R. 554-555, 559-560; 561632). It was provided in the form of a Rule 60(b) Motion and Memorandum to Amend Order
Concerning Summary Judgment (R. 561-632). The trial court found said motion to be
procedurally flawed and without merit and denied it as not establishing grounds for relief
under Rule 60(b). (R. 668-670; 679-680).
Panos has not challenged this finding and order on appeal but only makes a passing
note of it in his brief. (Br. of Applt. p. 21). Even if Panos argues he has appealed this issue,
it is clear that it has not been adequately briefed and"[i]t is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed," State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 304 (Utah 1998).
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Purchase Contract which contains language about the height restriction that is veiy
similar to that in the warranty deed. (R. 394)(See Addendum a A"). It states in
Addendum 1 to the contract that 'The only height restriction (from the road) is 321. (R.
394)(See Addendum "A" -addendum 1). It does not refer to any other document as any
sort of reference for this height restriction. It contains the same limitation as the warranty
deed: 32 feet as measured from the road, and nothing further ("street" in the case of the
warranty deed). (Record 397)(See Addendum "B"). Therefore, the only other written
document in this case evidences the parties' prior intent/understanding is this Real Estate
Purchase Contract. It was signed by both parties and contains essentially the same
language regarding the height restriction as the warranty deed. This is the best evidence
of a "meeting of the minds" between the parties and it overwhelmingly favors Olsen's
positions.4 Neither document relies or references the survey and the narrow reference
point now asserted by Panos. (Addendum "A" and "B").

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE WHERE THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
The trial court was correct in granting Olsen's Motion for Summary Judgment
because there was no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining. Motions for

A

It should be noted that in the event the extrinsic evidence is insufficient to determine
the intent of the parties, the trial court should resort to the rule of construction of construing
an ambiguous contract against the drafter. Edwards & Daniels Architects v. Farmer's
Properties, 865 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah App. 1993); see also Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, as recognized in Freeman v.
Gee, 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967) in the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions,
the Courts will resolve all doubts in favor of free and unrestricted use of property. Freeman
v. Gee, 18 P.2d at 159; see also Parrish v. Richards, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (Utah 1959).
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summary judgment should be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and review
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness." Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const.,
Inc., 101 P.3d 371, 374 (Utah App. 2004)(citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT
130.H13, 63 P.3d 705).
Panos' only claim is that Olsen violated the height restriction as contained in the
warranty deed because he believes the house is higher than his subjective interpretation of
the 32 foot height restriction as stated in the warranty deed that he signed and approved.
(R. 1-6). As set forth in Panos' brief and above, he contends that the measurement for the
height restriction should have been taken from a specific spot of his choosing on the street
west and adjacent to the property and referenced in Appellant's Brief Exhibits "E" and
fc6

F\ (Br. of Applt. 22-24; Br. of Applt. Exhibits "E" and "F"). Also as discussed above,

because the language in the warranty deed is unambiguous and does not contain as
narrow a point measurement requirement as that advocated by Panos, the parol evidence
offered by Panos is inadmissible. (R. 397)(See Addendum "B")(See also Morris v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200-1201 (Utah
1983)(Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol
evidence may be permitted; when the existence of a contract and the identity of its parties
are not in issue and when the contract provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of
the contract can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment)(emphasis
added).
Because the language of the warranty is clear and unambiguous and parol evidence
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is inadmissible, the only question of fact upon which the trial court had to pass was
whether the house built on the property is 32 feet or lower as measured "from the existing
street." (R. 397)(See Addendum "B). After the conveyance of the property from Panos
to Olsen through the warranty deed on August 6, 2001, construction was begun on a
house on the property. (R. 380, 405). At one point, after the trusses of the home were
adjusted to lower the roof, Olsen and Associates retained Ensign Engineering to provide a
survey determining the elevation of the home. (R. 380, 405). Said survey, as attested by
affidavit, found the house to be in compliance with the height restriction of 32 feet in ihe
warranty deed in that the top of the roof was measured and found to be 31.96 feet above
the gutter point on the street at the north/west corner of the property. (R. 492-93, 496)
(See Addendum "C").
Panos did not provide admissible evidence to the trial court to refute Olsen5s
survey and the expert testimony that the house was in compliance with the height
restriction. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment was
appropriate. The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that "[u]pon a motion for summary
judgment, the courts ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce
some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the movant's case or specify in an affidavit
the reason why he cannot do so." Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960).
Further, "the materials presented by the moving party are sufficient to entitle him to a
directed verdict and the opposing party fails either to offer counteraffidavits or other
materials that raise a credible issue or to show that he has the evidence not then available,
summary judgment may be rendered for the moving party." Id. Finally, Motions for
Summary Judgment serve the salutary purpose of limiting time and expense of a trial
when a party is entitled to relief based on the law as applied to the undisputed facts.
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Brandt v. Springville Banking Company, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960); W.M. Barnes
Co. V. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1981). Such summary relief
is sorely needed in the present case.
The survey requested by Olsen together with the expert testimony regarding it,
show that the house complies with the warranty deed's height restriction in that "the top
of the roof was measured and found to be 31.96 feet above the gutter point on the street at
the north/west comer of the property." (R. 492-93, 496)(See Addendum "C").5 Panos did
not refute this with competent evidence. Before oral argument and before the trial court's
order granting summary judgment, this proof by Olsen that the house comports with the
warranty deed's height restriction, was not refuted by Panos with admissible evidencenamely expert testimony in the form of affidavits, deposition testimony, etc. There were
only bare assertions and allegations in Panos' motions, replies and at oral argument,
unsupported by proper evidence, to attempt to refute that Olsen's survey was incorrect
when measured from the street, and most of those relate to the already addressed
improper parol evidence that the measurement point used was not the spot on the street
Panos had in mind.
There was, therefore, "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving

Panos seems to argue, without evidentiary support, that the measuring point used in
the survey requested by Olsen was from a "curb" and not "from the existing street lying west
and adjacent to said land" as specified in the warranty deed. (Emphasis added)(See Applt.'s
Br. pp. 16-17). This argument fails, however, because David Jenkins specifies in his
affidavit that "the top of the roof was measured and found to be 31.96 feet above the gutter
point on the street at the north/west comer of the property" not on a curb, as alleged by Panos
but unsupported. (R. 492-93,496)(See Addendum "C")(emphasis added) Counsel for Panos
also admitted to the trial court that he had never visited the property and was unsure of its
orientation and physical characteristics. Thus, the mistaken assumption of a "swamp cooler."
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party (Olsen) is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).6

POINT III
THE TRIAL DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO REFORM THE WARRANTY
DEED
The trial court ruled correctly when it implicitly refused to reform the warranty
deed. "Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where the
terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the
agreement between the parties." Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah
1984)(footnotes omitted). "There are two grounds for reformation of such an agreement:
mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or mistake by one party, coupled with fraud
by the other party." Id. Reformation is appropriate, however, only "where the written
instrument is not in conformity with the parties' agreement, not where the parties have
failed to agree." Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 325 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis
added). "We will not make a contract for the parties which they did not make, only
reform a contract to reflect the agreement they actually made." Id. at 325-26.
Additionally, a party asserting mistake in the reformation context has the burden to
show mistake by clear and convincing evidence. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981
(Utah 1979). Finally, "a party seeking reformation of a deed due to mutual mistake must
plead such mistake with particularity." Id. (citing Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Olsen first asserts that Panos has not adequately preserved the issue of reformation
()

See footnote 3 for the proposition that any evidence submitted well after the trial
court had ruled on the Motions for Summary Judgment in an improper Rule 60(b) Motion,
was not timely submitted or properly before the trial court and therefore should not be
considered when reviewing the correctness of the trial court's rulings below.
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happened before [the grantor] signed the warranty deed." Id. Further, an examination of
the language in the warranty deed itself suggested that grantor's intent to convey the
disputed land to Kelsch was not clear. Id. The Court, therefore, concluded that the trial
court erred in finding mutual mistake. Id.
The facts of the case at hand are strikingly similar to those in Neeley. Panos seeks
to reform a warranty deed claiming the title company erred in the drafting of the height
restriction in the warranty deed in the deed. (Br. of Applt. at 24-28). Panos, like Kelsch,
put forth the testimony of a witness, his real estate agent (because, again, Panos did not
have any conversations or contact with Olsen until after the closing) who stated he had
conversations with Olsen regarding the height restriction and measuring point for it and
that an understanding or agreement was reached. (R. 447-48, 489-90; 535-542). Panos
asserts it his intention to have the measuring point of the height restriction defined at an
exact location to be referenced by the survey. (Br. of Applt. p. 27). However, he signed
and approved the deed as drafted and there is no contrary agreement to support a mutual
mistake theory.
Like the facts in Neeley with its land contract, the Real Estate Purchase Contact in
this case, does not prove mistake because of the merger doctrine and the same fact that
anything could have happened before Panos signed the warranty deed. Neeley v. Kelsch,
600 P.2d at 981; (R. 388-395)(See Addendum "A"). Further, as set forth above, the
purchase contract in the case at hand contains almost the same language regarding the
height restriction as does the warranty deed and, therefore, refutes rather than supports
Panos5 theory of mistake. (Addendum "A" and "B").
Finally, as was the case in Neeley, the language of the warranty deed does not in
any way suggest mistake by the parties because the language is unabmbiguous and is
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consistent with the language in the purchase contract. (R. 397)(See Addendum ~ET).
Taken all together, as the Court did in Neeley, "mutual mistake of the parties" was not
proven by a preponderance of the evidence let alone clear and convincing as required by
the case law. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court correctly concluded that
reformation of the deed was not appropriate.
Furthermore, in Neeley, the Court also found that Kelsch, in his pleadings (the
counterclaim) did not set forth with particularity any attack upon the deeds based on
mutual mistake and only generally asserted his ownership. Id. In his opening statement,
counsel for Kelsch did mention mistake, but did not ask for an amendment of the
pleadings to properly put the mistake before the trial court. Id. Therefore, it was
improper for the trial court to have heard parol evidence intended to modify the deeds and
should have only examined the face of the deeds to resolve the dispute. Id As set out
above, Olsen asserts the same to be true as applied to the facts in this case.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, and as set forth above, Olsen asserts that the
trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that Panos did not provide clear and
convincing proof sufficient to survive summary judgment.8

8

In the reform argument section of Appellant's Brief, he cites and quotes extensively
from the case of Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). Panos' reliance on Hartman
in the reformation context, however, is misplaced. In Hartman Plaintiffs did not seek
reformation of the deed, nor did they make any assertion of ambiguity in the deed, unlike the
facts of the case at hand. Id. at 655. Hartman is not, therefore, relevant to a claim involving
reformation of a deed as well as claimed ambiguity.
Regardless, Panos misreads Hartman in over emphasizing the proposition that the
intent of the grantor controls what has been transferred to the grantee. (Br. of Applt. p. 25).
The Supreme Court made clear that "'[i]t is a cardinal rule of deed construction that the
intention of the parties as drawn from the deed must goven," and that "[i]t is the court's duty
to construe a deed as it is written, and in the final analysis, each instrument must be
construed in the light of its own language and peculiar facts. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d
656 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Olsen asks this Court to affirm that the trial court's
correctly concluded that the merger doctrine applies and that summary judgment was,
therefore, appropriate in favor of Olsen. Additionally, Olsen respectfully motions this
Court for an award of attorney fees if he prevails on appeal pursuant to the provision in
the Real Estate Purchase Contract that provides in pertinent part:
In Actions to Enforce this Contract. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration
to enforce this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
(R. 392)(See Addendum "A"); Management Services v. Development Associates, 617
P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)("a provision for the payment of attorney's fees in a contract
includes attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if
action is brought to enforce the contract.").
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / ^

day of May, 2005.

Patrick V. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, first-class mail postage pre-paid, two (2) true and
correci copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellee to Thor B. Roundy, Counsel for
Appellant, 448 East 400 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this / / ^ day of
May, 2005.
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Addendum "A"

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
5 a )c$a»»y binding contract Uttn taw r*$aires re»* tsuio licensees to u$* this form. Buy»r #nd Seller. hs**o</er. may agri« to jrlr^r or
i;« protons, or to use a dllenfu form. If yau desir* jega' or lax -.avkd, consult your attorney or tax aoVtsor.
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
•r
QtSfrf
' A S5g»c. - C o f u s r . ^ T V g >
„ _ _ Offers to purchase the Property
ribed below and hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of $ / . Op O
in the kern of
^M4pJj0y.
QK
~ which, upon Acceptance of this offer by ali parties (as defined in Section 23). snail be
isiiscTrn accordance with state law
?ived by: m
* ra S* :

C J&** /({
Ok£>£/V

*.

AsS*c~

M

/

^

^<A~ttrJ^

on
P*^

7 ~& ~°L

Phone Number

P«e,

SS?*OC9S~.

OFFER TO PURCHASE
PROPERTY:
/ / g<95T
describees:
iH^^O.
of _ , SJKM/^L

^o

&L*\
A»r
Tn
. County of

ferp^S
^A^rZjr^^
<<£ L _ J

fco<0

,

'

, , .
. State of Utah (The "Property").

1.1
Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this saie includes me foilow'ng items if presently attached to the Property:
nbing, heading, air conditioning fixtures 3nd equipment, ceiimg fans: water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs;
iroom fixtures; curtains, tdmp&ries and rods; window aod door screens; storm dorxs and windows; window blinds; awnings;
Bfiec television antenna, satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic ganags door opener and
ompanying transmitters); fentin^ and trees and shrubs. The following items snail also be included in this sale and conveyed
ef separate Bit! of Sale with warranties as to me-

1.2

ESfctJuded Items. The following itsms are excluded from \hls sale

1,3

Water Rights. The following water rights are lndu6&6 in t^ sale;

1.4
Survey. A survey map of the Property certified by a licensed surveyor [ ] W J L L ( ] WILL NOT be prepared The
penly corners [ ] WILL I ] WILL NOT be marked by survey stakes set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company. The
;t of the applicable items checked above wilt be: [ ] paid by Buyer [ ] paid by Setter [ ] shared equally by Buyer and
ler [ ) Other (specify)
_. For additional terms, see attached Survey Addendum if applicable.
PURCHASE PRICE. Tr*e Purchase Pnce 'or the Property is 5 5 7

QoO

Method of Payment The Furch^se Pnce *\:1 oe pa;2 3S foi'-ews

2.1
' C?QQ_"
,

(a) Earnest Money Deposit Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS DEPOSIT
MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
(b) ^ e w Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2 3 Buyer wi-'i apply for
one or more c* »ne fcflgwino loans* [ J CONVENTIONAL [ ) FHA { ] VA
{ } OTHER (specify}
~
li an rHA/VA loan 3DpH?s, see anaensd FHA/VA Loan Addendum
rf tne loan is to ffldede any particular terms, then cnec< beto** and gtve detaus
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

___ (c)
[dj
gePJkSl^^Z
it)
m>f%3ST
•
[T)

?*gc 1 of 6 p*£«

Lo^n A«umc3t*on ;see airacr-ed Assumption Ac&zrdum *»f appi.-catle;
S**W Financing <see wZachcCSeficr Fir*ronq AcDtr-CirrJiapo.ica^e}
Other (specify)
^ <Z~9%
OrsCJ^^T
r <Z*~<~ /
Sai*rce of ^ r c h a s e Price in Casn i t Sctcement

lt k f O f
^]\M
***l f j/l/h
w»K>,qte£^

Sefkr *$ In ilia is

M

9

^r^i

g g s j
-^

^ ^ f c i i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / ' ifritr

"7

P-02

—r?'Q/

2.2
(a)
IUX
W

Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
f ] Buyers obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable ioan(s1
r^ ^z™** .n Section 2, ] (b) or (c) (the 'Loan'). This condition is referred to as the 'Financing Condition,"
C<1 Buyer s obligation lo su'chasc the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Duyer qualifying for a loan. Section 2 3
does not apply.
' ^ ' *

2.3
(a)

Application 1or loan.
Buyer's dtrt/cs. No later than the Application Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shad apply for the loan,
ToanAppficattor' occurs only when Suyer has; (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the 'Lender*)
the iniiiaJ loan application ard documented required by the Under; and (it) paid ail loan application fees as
required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently worktoobtain ihg Loan. &uy&r will promprly provide the Lender,
with any additional documentation a$ required by the Lender.
Procedure if Loan Application ia denied. If Suyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender does
ngt approve the Loan (a "Loan Denial*}, Buyer shall, no later than three calendar doy$ thereafter, provide a copy
to Seller, Bjyer or Seller may, within throe calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract
by providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.3(D): (i) if the Loan
Denial was receded by Buyer on or before {be Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the
Earnest Money Deposit shall be turned to Buyer; (il) if the Loan Denial was received by Buyer after the Earnest
Money Forfeiture OeadBnet Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seller agrees to accept as Sriler's exclusive remedy, the
Earnest Money as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in thiS/Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on
the Financing Condition sol forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of
this Contract sha'i be governed by such other provisions.

(b)

2.4 Appraisal of Property. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [ J t S k f l *S NOT conditioned upon the
Property apprising for not less than the Purchase Pries, if the appraisal condition appKe^awfthe Property appraises for \e$$
than the Purchase Price, Buyer may canceJ th>$ Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days
after Buyer's receipt of notice of the appraised value, in the event of such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be
released to Buyer, regardless of whether $vch cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. A failure
to cancel as provided m this Section ZA shall be deemed a waiver of the appraisal condition by Buyer.
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before ihe Settlement Deadline referenced in Section
24(e). "Settlement" shall occur or^\y when all of the following have been competed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed znd
delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office at! documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow
instructions or by applicable law, (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds
of any new loan) have beer delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/plosing office In the form of collected or cleared funds; •
and (c) any monies requrcd to be paid by Seller under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the
escrow/dosing office »n tneformof ejected or cleared funds, Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/?) of the fee charged
by the escrow/dosing office ior its services in the settlement/closing process. Taxes and assessments for the current year.
rents, and interest on assu-ned obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section* Tenant deposits
(including, but not limited to, security deports, cleaning deposits and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller lo Buyer
at Settlement. Probations sc* forth in this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(e),
unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing could include the settlement statement. Th^ transaction will
be considered closed when Settlement has been completed, and when at! of the following have been completed: p) the
proceeds of any new bar, nave been delivered by the Lender to Seder or to the escrow/dosing office; and (»} the applicable
Closing documents have been recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions described in pans (i) and (5) of the
preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar days of Settlement
4. POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: £•£]
[ 1 Other (specify)
_

hours [ ],

. days after Closing;

fiRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract:

} j Sellers Initiate

f

J Buyers Initials

The Cistinc Aaent,

'J&XV
TtfZAP?
~/^~)
~ ~ 3 , Jf~\,
The Selling Acent. ^~^JtuJ/(
• ^JLfl^-—^
~ ~ / T ~ Z 3 u r e / r
X3
?%d 1 ctf $ ?*S*S

JUL~36-2001

Sr!kT"S Initial

5^:27

^fefffl

represents! 3 Seller { ] Buyer ( ] both Buyer and Seller
** « Limited Ugcni:
,repre-sents[ ] Seller p$\Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Soliw
A
lo**«se*
£^r^<_
—Limited Agent;

^*-JjL^l&4

S01553S3SS

*»?«*"* XnilAfc*-^/V<-<L D » _ / ^ ^ 2 Z .

9?*

P.23

"he baling Broker.

_

'We SeH»r.g Broker, > ^ — V < j f t y
f
f

/(

_ _ _ . < represents [ ] Seller [ ) Buytr [ J both Buyer and Seller
QyfrW^s

represents! J Seller JxfBuy^r [ ] both Buyer and Seller
* s a Limited Agent,

TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Salter sprees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of tltla insurance insuring
hryer in the amount of the Purchase p nce
SELLER.DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Dezdfae reicrtrsceti in Section 24(b), Seller snail provide to
iuyer the following documents which are collectively reiened to as the "Seller Disclosures".
a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated Dy Setter;
b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance,
c) a copy of any teases affecting the Prooerty not exp ring p'ior to Closing;
d) written notice ofanyclwms
and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and buifdmg or zoning code
violations; and
2) Other (specify)
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AMD JNSPECTIPNS, Buyer's obligation to purchase under this
Jontraci (check applicable boxes).
] IS [ ] IS HOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the content of all th« Setter Disclosures referenced in Section 7.
j 15 I ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's app r oval of a physical condition inspection of the Properly;
j IS [ j IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property- (specify)
_
£ * K ^ . . -fliQ0£«M«*n.l
_.&(
~
, ..,
any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8 1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8,4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply Tne
ems checked »n the affirmative above are collectively relerred to as the "Evaluations L Inspections*' Unless otherwise provided in
us Contract, the Eva'uafions & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer ard shall be conducted by individuals or entities of Buyer's
noicc Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections 3nd with the walk-through inspection under Section 11
8.1
f*eriod for Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections, No later than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline
jferenced in Section 24(c) Buyer sha!t- (a) complete Bll Evalustipo? & Inspections. $nd (b) determine if the Evaluations &
ispections are acceptable to Buyer
B.2
Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, no
iter than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, either (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seder, whereupon the
amest Money Deposit shad be released to Buyer or (b) provide Sel>e< with written notice of objections.
8,3
Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Buyer Cancellation Deadline. Buyer does not (a) cancel this Contract
s provided in Section 3.2. or (b) deliver a written objectior to Seller regarding the Evaluations & inspections the Evaluations &
,spect«ons shall be tiserriad approved by Buyer
a.4
Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written object.ons to Seller, Buyer ana Seller shall have seven calendar days
ter Seiier's rece-pt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Penod") m which to agree in writing upon the manner of resolving
uyer's objections Seller may but shall not be requ red to, resolve Buyer's objections If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in
r ling upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Sjycr may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no
ter than tnree C3\cn03f day* after expiration of the Response Period] whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shatf be released to
uyer, regardlc&s of whether sue* cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadhne. If tnis Contract •$ not
irceled by Buyer unoer tfvs Section 3 4 Buyers oDjecticns shall be deemed waived by diiyer This wa*ver shall not affect tnose
»m$ warranted in Section 10.
ADDITIONAL ITnMS. There [ ] ARE [ ) ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms *f there are,
e terms of the fdtowu-g addenda are incorporated into this Contract by tnis reference' [ J Addendum No,
J Survey Addendum [ ) Seller Financing Addendum [ J FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum
} Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law)
] Other (specify)
^ g ^
A r?JfrypiC*f^
^^ \

Pkzr 3 of 6 page*
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Seller's Initials
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D*fg ^jjbhl

6015333095

Buyer's ln'iti*l*>^^J\xJ)

97*

Dd«

P,84

10.

SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTAT10NS,
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Soil*' has fe# title to thft Property and will convey good and marketable title
to Buyer a: Closing by general warranty deed, unless the sale is being made pursuant to a real estate contract which provides for
title to pass at a later date, in that case, title will ba conveyed in accordance >vith {he provisions a! thai contract Buyer agrees,
however. to accept title to the Property subject to the following matters of record1 easements, deed restrictions. CC&R's (meaning
covenants, conditions and restrictions), and nghts-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Tills Insurance as
agreed to by Buyer under Section 8 6uyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property dr>6
not exp<nn9 crior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilises. and
cmer se^vice-s provided to the Property after Closing. Except to any Joan(s) specifically assumed by Buyec under Section 2 1(c).
Seller Wilt cau^e fo be paid off by Closing aft mortgages, -taist dee4$, judgments, mechanic's i'iens. tax )jens and warrants. Seller
WJII cause 10 be paid current by Closing all assessments at\0 homeowners association dues.
10 2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will oe in the following condition ON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a)
the Property shad be broom-clean and Use of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related
damage to the Property shafl be repaired at Seller's expense;
(b)
the heating, cooling, electrical, plumoing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and tne appliances and fireplaces w;if be
«n wonting order and fit for their intended purposes:
(0
the roof and foundation shaP be free of leaks known to Se^er:
(d)
any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order and fit
'or i£ intended purpose; and
(ej
trie Property and improvements, including the landscaping, win be in the same general condition as they were on the
dale of Acceptance.
11. WALK THROUGH INSPECTION, Before Settlement, Buyer may. upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable Itme. conduct
a "walk-though* nspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is *a$ represented," meaning that Ihe items
referenced »n Sections 1,1, 8.4 and 10.2 (Ihe items") are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and in the warranted
condition I' me »tems are not as reprezsrt&d. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace correct or ^p2Lir the Items or\ with the
consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same, The failure to conduct a
wau-througft inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by Bjyer of Ihe right to receive,
on the date of possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the teit of Acceptance until the date of Closing, nons of the
'oHowwng s^aii occur w-thout the pnor written consent of Buyer (a) no changes In any existing leases shall be made: (b) no new
leases sr.au be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken; and (d) no
'urner financial encumbrances to the Property snail be made.
11 AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or other
em.ty. t*e r*-^c executing this Contract on its behal f warrants nl$ pr her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller.
14 COMPLETE: C O N T R A C T . This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, constitutes
r e cn{«>e Contract oetween \he parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
unoe-stard ngS 0 ' contracts between the parties. This Contract eanoot be changed except by written agreement of the ^rves
15. DlSPUTt RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to ifcis Contract
[ J S H A L L ( ] MAV (upon mutual agreement of the parties) fifst be submitted to mediation, tf the parties agree to mediation, the
csc^e s ^ f oc submtted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to
b~ar *s c^r costs of mediation, if meo»at<on fatfsr the other procedures and remedies available under th-.s Contract shall apply
Noting, n rr.is St-cbon 15 shall prohibit any party hcrr\ seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
16. DEFAULT if Suye' defaults. Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as Jiqu«datad damages, or to return
it an: s^e Stye- to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other retries
available at law. ti Seller defaults, m *£d**Joo to
return ci it\c Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Se^er a sum equal to the Earriesx Money Deposit 3$
•ic-^a'eo sarvaocs or mzy sue SeMer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. if Buyer
ei?c?3 TD ace?Dt wq^dated damages, Seller ZQTZSS to pay trv> tfqudated damages to Buyer upon demand. It is agreed tte* denial
of a ^z±r *co.*c.ron made by the Buyer is not a default ^nd •$ governed by Section 2.3(b)
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
, ilt,pa-— o- bmd.no arbitration » «^<crwtt«s.Contact, tne
* i 7 ? . n i c ^ . to enro,c- th<* Contract In the event o ' ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i M t bs 3 * 3 ^ ° for p**c.«*-» i n
proving pany shall be envted to costs and reasonable attorney fees Attorney *.
radiation under Section 15
,T
1

17.2 m interpleader Actions. If a principal broker hokfcng the Earnest Money ^
^
iraVLmVa"
interpleader acuon in court to resolve a dispute over that Deposit, Buyer and ? * f ? ^ o n 2 ^
XoTpoat
Deposit an amount necessary to advance the court costs ne*6«i to burg that ' f i * e ^
rema^g after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court Buy* and Seller further agree
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
fouad to be m default may be ordered to pay any reasonable attorney l^s, or add*onal c 0 ^ ™ % ^
broker ,n br.n»ng the action, unless ^ court finds that there was fault on the part of the principal broker or Ns or her agent that
woud make such ar\ award of attorney fees and costs unjust.
18. NOTICES. Except as provided m Section 23. all notices required under this Contract must be (a) in wribng, (b) signed by the
party giving not.ee and (c) received oy the other party or tne other party* agent no later than the applicable date reft(ence6 »n this
Contract
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions Of Sections 15 and 17.1 ^
provisions of th»s Contract shall not apply after Closing

BKpreBS warranties made in thi* Contract the

20. RISK OF LOSS. A/I n$k of loss to tne Property not caused by Seder or Buyer, including physical damage or destruction to the
Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a takirg in eminent domain, shall
be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer.
21 TIME is OF THE ESSENCE. Time rs of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract Extensions must be
agreed to m wnt.ng by ail parties, Unless otherwise explicitly stated in th'ts Contract: (a) performance under each Section of this
Cor tract which references a date shall absotutery be requ'red by 5 00 PM Mountain Time on tne stated date, and (b) the term
'days* shall mean calendar d*y% and shall be counted beginning on the day folrowing the event which triggers the timing
reoa'-ement (i e , Acceptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc )• Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be
ending uoon tit'c companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to m writing
by $ucn non-party
22 FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a Signed copy of this Contract any addenda
ard covjnte'of'ers, and the retransmission of any signed f^x sha«i be the same as delivery of an original This Contract and any
acsenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts
23 ACCLPTANCE. Acceptance4 occurs when Selier or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other (a; signs the
offer QI counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's agent tHat
tne offer or counteroffer has bcer\ Signed as required
24,
(a)
(b)
ic)

CON7 RACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller ag'ee that the following deadlines shall appty to this Contract
Application Deadline
^pJ^Ho l a t c r ! h * n
calendar 4zya after Acceptance.
Sell*' Disclosure Deadline yj^r
No later th**
calendar days after Acceptance.
Buyer Cancellation Deadline* {£*
No later ih*n
calendar days after Buyer's receipt of all of the
* &^
Seller Disclosure*.
id) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadlm«
calendar days after the Buyer CanceHation Deadline.
(ej Settlement Deadline
NlC*_ \
^o-ct (
(DATE)
25 OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. 6uyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terns and conditions If Setter
co*5 -ct accec* t*vs cf er by
C6Q f ] AW [VJPM Mountain TJT*
*~*%E , , 3 u w &_. &&&( . th.s ofer
sn*. a^se and tne 5re*erage shaft return the EarnfeiUoney Depos#rr5^uyeS
r - C / J~s *
iBuyvs S graiure)

l 0 fer

Date)

^Buy^S^J^f^

Tfw otor v4 t*e **VK Off*- Zitrs tn»H U ft«yc

(Suyars Nane^) (PLEASE PRiNT)

Pi«« 5 of 6 pa £W

Seller'* IttuB

*****

Of**r Rei&tnct Catc'

<ftefce A * m s )

,4^0

0»»«

/^>/P-/

^^^ffeoSi

^ M * 1 ' M****

(Pn^T
D

»"_

'QEPUUCEfCODHmOFFZRJRBJECTlOH
SMGCK ONF

, TO PURCHASE* Seller Accepts (he foregoing offer on th* terms a^3 conditions vpeofie-j sbove

{ ] ACCCnTANCf OF <

I J cot

Sefii
melons it

presents tor Buyers Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subjec' to the exceptions or
\c\ the attached ADDENDUM tfO

9£fl Z'Yy

;
skiers Stgratufj?)

Time)
jTi

(Date)

(ftrf mfc. 1Apg <?,„ / r V t e C f J ^

(SeLers Names)
s) (PL
(PLEASE^RINT)

<^>t^^efefeL^^

'

MI

JLAJ

(Sally's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

wno t HiArsLr**. ^ L i M fifty
(Notice Address) 0

(/'hone)

J ] REJECTION Sel'er Rejects the foregoing offer

(Sellers Signature)

(Date)

(Ttme)

(Date)

(Sellers Stgnatjre)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seilc with cop»es of thrs Contract beanng all signatures (Pitt m applicable sect c»n
Pe'ow)
A. I acknow'etfge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Contract beanng ail £»gnatures

ure)
(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

urej
eHers Signature)

(Date)

(Sellers SgnaUre)

s~\

(Date)

B I pcrsonaMy caused a f na* copy o f the forgoing Contract beanng all signatures to be [ 1 faxed {
delivered on
19
postage prepaid, to tne [ ] Seller f ] Buyer

] mailed [

Sent/Dciivered by (specify)

THIS FC&tf APPROVED BY TH£ UTAH REAL ESTATE COMM!SS«OK ANO THE OFFICE OF TH£ UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
£FFECT VE JUNE 11 1*S€ (T REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPRO/ED VERSIONS OF THIS FO*M

ftf
Pa-e 6 of 6 {>«£«

Seller's Initiate

^•S.-ol
lUtt

jj

Burtr's Intu&ls

Date

//

JUL-Q9-2QQ1 12 29

BQ1553QQ9Q

9S5f

P.B7

] hand

I

ADDENDUM »__ 1
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
(the "RE?CM) with an Offer Refer
ence Date of July $ 2QQ1 including all addendum and Counter
offers, between O S £ N 4 *&*>#ATES gQHSTSUCTlONl JNC, as Buyer, and
aj Cellar.
The following terras are hereby incorporated *4 part gf the REPC cad to the ertcnt these terms modify
or conflict with any provision* of the _
Real Estate Purchase Contract , thejp terms shaB control, A)l other
ternvs of the REf C not modified s&all remain the same.

fi

Earnest money to be deposited with Olscn <£ Associate Realtors Inc. (Trust Account)

a Property is located at 11805 £!m Ridge &oed (listing # 205216)
„ Purchase price is $59,000.
Q

At etong - price i$ to be reduced by 3 5% and there wHl he no Setting office commission pcid.

q Utilities (sewer. *oter# gas, power) stubbed to property
a

Closing to be o* or before Au$. 1st 2001.

a

The only height restrict*on (from the road) is 32',

Q

Subject tc seems, survey and plot maps from iistino, office.

0

Closing To be with Title Ont, Title Company 26&-O606

e

There will be no tellers disclosures reared except that lot must be approved to build o home on without
restrictions or limiting easements from Sandy City or other restrictions that would abnormally limit the
;

use or building of a new home,

fl

SrJlcrs state by closing that they kr*>* of no adverse conditions or restrictions regarding the property.

Seller skall have untU ^My 6__, at i:00 [ ] AM [X] P.M Mo^Tain Time lo accept these terms in aooordanoe with
the Real Estate P u r d u $ * Contract Unless so accepted, tills offer shall lapse.
Buyers ^2i^EN 1rtfrSgfl/TESCOJ
VyJayMOlam, Reader C

jOJfMst

f

/[

CHECK OKI.
f ] Aecept-Tnce- Seller hereby acdcptiy&fesc&r/is.
Sellers Signature
Sellers Stature

/ A/i/sllJ

_ C^'

^^

\Jf^^.

P*ir 7 V ? <Y Jime J&Z2ZS)

/

A, /

01^*-^
<fy/3S&A

[ ] Rejection, Buyer rejects these term*,

^

Date f u ^
Jate

(Initials!?

Time £ n f .

I^jL^r^JJj^2
CD-ite) „

,

(Time)

[ j Counter- See attached addendum
Document Receipt
I Acknowledge receipt of a final copy bearing ill «jnature*;
3uycrs

OLS£N & ASSOCIATES CONSTRUCTION ?NC

Sellers S.gn*:i-re

JUL-06-2081

10*29

Date

B0:5S32398

97>;

Tune

p,0e

67/12/2931

11:39

BUI^D/:

ADDENDUM NO, Z ^
TO
RLAL ESTATt PURCHASE CONTRACT

P*C?

__ of _ v __

THIS IS AK|p4ADDENDUM [ ] COUNl £ROfPER to thai R£AJ_ ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRAC 7 (the "REPC"; * m
sr Offer Reference Da:o c
3ii^ 13&&J
including all pno^aciderid^ and counteroffers, between
Q^J&ILAJXJ&C
.,
fej&O&ci&TiajJ^
3$ Buy*' ggj ffc-^U.<AtJ*±J*\.
_r*"**JT.
as Soi^r

regaling ihe Property ioeated a4 . _ J i ^ ^ V * ^ £ * £ _
following lerms arc ^erevy iruoryof atcd <»•? na~ ^ thr REPC

O^^^A^^

_.„___

!

I

The

"""

j * £ *ZfO>l&\

.

%.

_

To fre extent (he terns of ih:s AUDfcNDUM r o d * / oi connect witn any provisions of ln« REPC, induing oil prioi addends
and comteiafferti. mese ter,?--s sna:! confroi AH ome/ ;cfn^;> of the R£PC including all prior addenda ana cDU'^'c'ters.
nei modified by this A Q U E N D U M s t o i remain :he sarntt.-k4-S^^r ( } Buytr snail have unto _?«3a [ ] A M ^ PM
MouniaKTf^ne on
7#A4/
(Pate) To accept tne terms o' lhi$ ADDENDUM »n accordance w-ti* <><*
. ^ . ; ^ / , . ••$
o o
A 'i.\ c c l l o n 23"cMrt'RcPC Unrest so a c r . ^ e d ttie offer a$ stt forth in this ADDENOUM shal' tepsf

I Buyer1

&Hie> o^ndt.Ke

(Date; ( f i n e )

^ T ^ i B u V 3 r ^ " Seller Signature
"

. . . . / rr-nxr't
- . - .
roa^e)

ACCEPTANCE/GOUNfERQFFER/REJECNON
r w i i C K ONE
Wq ACCEPTANCE. [ JSeflorf

] Buyer ne:ccy arcfepis ihe t«rTi^ of this ADDENDUM.

] COUNTEROFFER, f ) S*ii*r [ ] B a y e r y

s 3$> 3 ccunte.^fef/^e iwros of attached ADDENDUM NO

DObenS Assoc Const h a
S^nat-^rc

/

^

'DaU«; (Tiov;,

/
/
! ] REJECTION: { } S~eJ(e» | ] Suyer-e;»?c:i; i / ^ / ' o n ^ ^ A P D E N ' D J M
^9~<L^:r.

'S^r^l^f?;

(Date) {T«nc-*.

TH:S ^ R M A f ^ K g v a 5 V • H t U ' A r l Kf A- £ S * * 7 L COMMISSION AND TH5 0££iCE O* THE : ^ A H ATTOftNfv GLHLR^L
F^ECTfV? ALrcU.,S" «. 7 !**A n *v_ PLACES A ^ U S U ^ H s ? ^ c t A ? L L PFf^yjOUSl Y APPROVED VERS JO W$ OF THtS FORM

rxiTi 1-A

Addendum f,BM

wir
( u
WHen Recorded Matt To
Oi!»n ii Asiociile* Cunjtructfun
In;

// )?0> Jb.SfXreSf
#502.
OfiflP&-i Or MoW
Ordif No. 5225?
Spwe at*s> c Uu> ILie for RSCOrtef 5 U*
Tix DNo. 28-29-22WO!

5UPCRIQR TITLE

Warranty Deed

PATRICK T. PANOS, CRANTOR(S)

hcrtb>i^a.W'F.Vi AND WARRANTS TO
OLS£« AND ASSOCIATES CONSTRUCTION, INC., GRANTEE(S)

for thdpam of (SI0 CO) Ten pollard did oLher gocd and valuable corsiderations the following described
tract ofuAfld in Silt Lake County, State of Uuh» ttvwu.
Lot 29JEAS1KJDGE NO,'2 SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof, en file aad of
record la the Salt Lake Coi!qfy Recorder's Office in Bouk ""-7 at Png« 236.
SLBJE T TO T i l l FOLLOWING 3HLD1NG RESTRICTION'S.
TIIF 4 OOF LEVEL OR HIGHEST rROTTON Of OHr SLILDIING OR PERMANENT
STRl C r t R I PLACED OrR CON'STRl CTID UPON SAID LAND bHALL NOT BE HIGHER
THAN 32 FEET. MFAKI-RED FROM TUh. EXISTING STREET U n O WEST AND
ADJAXfcNT TO MID LAND
y *rr^ESS :u.« nor'•efsaid Gr^u? n^etrtU) of August* :o«u

S

rttncU

*•

i>„

PaiJOi

i «

o<^-:.^.

Or - ^ «h OJ o' Va£ J«<* :C01, rerro^i . *~pca-cc bctVc :nc PMUI& T* ?A»OS, . • . ire

r

-c- s dt* "vc :bcn»y nstrj^crt. A ho * J> 3C*r«>« iedi-G :; £tj)&l such pej^cn^), executed the v\*

7

Mm«cr -iv hand ,*..*: o.^ciaJ sea!
llr< Public
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Addendum MC"
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BENCHMARK
RIVET IN CURB IN NORTHHE5T
OF SUBJECT LOT
(SEE THI5 SHEET;
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SURVEYORS NARRATIVE

c

\A

I Patrick. PI Harris do hereby state that I am a Registered
Professional Land Survayor holding certificate no 2 8 6 8 8 2 as
prescribed by the lams of the State of Utah and represent that I
have made a survey of the following described property The
purpose of this survey Is TO set the propen\j corners The Baels
of Bearing Is the lire betueen a monument found In Elm Ridge
Road at approximately 11805 South and a monument found at the
Intersection of Elm Ridge Drive ond Eastrldge Drive measuring
Souih 2 3 * 0 0 OO" Nest H6&B feet/ KH Ob feet record;

/H
\ 1

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
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All of Lot 1°i Eastndge No 2 Subdivision as found ond on fJle In
the Salt Lake County Recorders Office Book. 11-1 Page 236

1

«sj

xfhi v.***
Patrick T1 Harris
License No 2 8 6 8 8 2
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April 17,2002

Mr. Rick Olsen
Qlsen & Associates
11576 S. State Street
Suite 1201
Draper, Utah 84020
RE: Lot #29 Easlridgc No, 2 Subdivision
11805 S-Elm Ridge Road
Sandy, Utah
Dear Rick,
Per your reqjest, we have provided a survey determining elevations for the above
referenced house. The purpose of thi& suivcy wdb tu delcm-inc the height of [he home in
relation to the street in front of the home. This was required because of the building
restriction that is placed on this lot (hat states 'The roof level or highest portion of any
building or pemianent structure placed or oonstrurtfvl np-vn said land shall nor he h^hrr
then 32 feet, measured from the existing street lying west and adjacent to said land".
The survey was performed on Thursday April 11, 2002. We used the concrete gutter at
the northwest comer of the lot as an assumed benchmark of 100 JO. Based on our survey,
the top of the mof was measured to be at an e!e\ation of 133 96 feet or 3h% ic^et above
the gutter. The top of the rail of the neighbor's deck behind the home was also measured
and was dctciniincd tu be 131.88 feci or 31.S3 feet above the gutter,
Wc hope this prcwdes you with the information that ^ou need. If you have any questions
sr need t-dditioial sun ey measurements please give me a call

F. LaVar Christensen (5570)
Bill O.Heder (8190)
11576 S. State Street - Suite 501
Draper, Utah, 84020
Telephone: (801) 571-4487
Fax: (801) 571-0807
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICK T. PANOS, an individual,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JENKINS
vs.
Civil Case No. 020907697
OLSEN AND ASSOCIATES
CONSTRUCTION, INC, a Utah
corporation,

Judge: Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

FN THE STATE OF UTAH:
:§
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY:
David Jenkins, having first been duly sworn, now deposes and for testimony states as
follows:
1.

I am over the age of 18, free of any improper or undue influence, and able to

testify to the following matters of my own personal knowledge and experience.
2.

am an employee and licensed engineer at Ensign Engineering, an engineering,

TMormmo nnn snrvevme nrm located in sait i^aice L,ounry.

3

In early April 2002, our firm received a request from Olsen & Associates to

perform a survey and measurement to determine elevations on property identified as lot # 29,
EastridgeNo 2 Subdivision, at 11805 S Elm Ridge Road, Sandy, Utah
4

The purpose of the request was to determine whether the building which had been

constructed on said property was in compliance with a height restriction stated in the Warranty
Deed by which the property had been conveyed
5.

The restriction states "The roof level or highest portion of any building or

permanent structure place or constructed upon said land shall not be higher than 32 feet,
measured from the existing street lying west and adjacent to said land"
6

A survey was performed on Thursday April 11, 2002 wherein we first plotted the

boundaries of the property Thereafter, we used the concrete gutter at the northwest corner of
the property as an assumed benchmark of 100 00 The top of the roof was then measured and
found to be at an elevation of 131 96 feet, or 3 ] 96 feet above the gutter at the edge of the street
7

I sent a letter to Olsen & Associates providing my findings

8

In January, 2003, on their further request, my office prepared survey maps using

our sur\ ey of their boundary lines and then adding reference information to indicate our height
measurements at the gutter, at the highest point of the house, and at the deck railing on the house
located east and adjacent to the property
9

As stated in my letter to Olsen & Associates, following the height restriction

stated in the Warranty Deed to the property, I found the house constructed thereon to be within
compliance, measuring 31 feet, 96 inches above the gutter point on the street at the north/west

P . 03
•14-2S03

01:25

AM

DATED this 13^ day of October, 2003,

NOTARY PUBLIC
MICHAEL H RIDDLE
1142 WEST SHIELDS LANE
SOJTH JORDAN UT &4GS5
MV COMMISSION EXPIRES
JULY25TH 2004
STATE OF UTAH

David Jenkins, P.E

^P

2003, personally
*X dav of
Qc^oeJr
On this
appeared before trie David Jenkins, Who being first duly sworn, proved to me on the basU of
satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to on thisjnstrument, and
acknowledged that he voluntarily executed the same

NOTARY PUBU

3

Addendum "D"
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Addendum "I

Ron Thrapp/Associate Broker
801-891-2099

Transmittal Form
jReturn to"
Office Fax(ftQ 11 bb ] 'J63 I [cover page required)

umber:
ent

Review
se Comment
se Reply

LJ Home office fax: 801-565-1377
Date sent
Time sent
Number of pages inducfing cover page

"£.. 2

At Jfj

S

^ ^ UfA

L. , ^ /X6 6-

! ' f\ £ <

:y uMAC Real Estate
70 S Union Park Ave
Midvafer UT 84047

\ < 1A

paq^

y-s-

f nnnTOppv

7

I I ,d\ ai C hnstensen C >
• '01
Bill O Heder(8190)
11576 S State Street Suite SOI
Draper, Utah, 84020
Telephone (801)571 118/
Fax (ROM 571-0807

a sisrmcT COURT
'-rf Judicial District
JAN 2 B 20M
r

^ALT LAKE COUNTY

4z—
>'

Doputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Ol !! I V If

P\THICK i [' \ . \ u . \ an mdiwdual
( >RDER OJN CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SITMMARY JUDCMFNT

Plaintiff,

Civil Case No 020907697

vs
OLSEN AND ASSOClAItS
CONSTRUCTION, INC, a Utah
corporation

Judge, frank (j Noel

Dt'inidant.

This matter came regularly before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and nn Piamtif] i (loss Motion loi Summary Judgment Oral arguments were heard
December 12, 2003 Plaintiff was represented by Mr f hoi Roundy Defendant w is irpiesHifnl
b\ I" 1 d \ ii L hnstensen
Aflci review of the parties'filings pui si i riiil l» iheii mw mulion- tml lia\ nig heaid and
considered oral argument on the matter, the Court finds that the Merger Doctrine is applicable
aiv'

ntioliiiHnn fhi » t

ll upeuU

is a h u in Piamtiil s claim> J he I om I finds, as a

mattei of law, that the house in question satisfies the height description in the deed

Therefore,findinggood cause as stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs
claims is granted. Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's cross
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied

